The Dynamics of Climate Agreements by Bard Harstad




This paper provides a model in which countries over time pollute as well as invest
in technologies (renewable energy sources or abatement technologies). Without a
climate treaty, the countries pollute too much and invest too little, partly to induce
the others to pollute less and invest more in the future. Nevertheless, short-term
agreements on emission levels can reduce welfare, since countries invest less when
they anticipate future negotiations. The optimal agreement is tougher and more
long-term if intellectual property rights are weak. If the climate agreement happens
to be short-term or absent, intellectual property rights should be strengthened,
tari⁄s should decrease, and investments should be subsidized. Thus, subsidizing or
liberalizing technological trade is a strategic substitute for tougher climate treaties.
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Implementing e¢ cient climate change policies is tremendously di¢ cult. The climate is
a public good and emissions cumulate over time, generating a dynamic common pool
problem. In addition, a lasting solution may require investments in new technology.
Recent agreements have two distinct characteristics.1 First, they have focused on emis-
sions but ignored investments, perhaps because investment levels would be hard to verify
by third parties. Second, the commitments are relatively short-term, since committing to
the far future may be neither feasible nor desirable. How valuable is such an agreement?
How does it a⁄ect the incentive to invest in technology? What is the optimal term of
the agreement, and how do the answers hinge on existing trade policies and intellectual
property rights?
These questions are immensely important, but we do not yet have clear answers, or
a good framework for deriving them. This paper addresses the questions head-on by
isolating the interaction among negotiations, emission levels, and investments. I present
a dynamic framework in which, in every period, countries pollute as well as invest in
technology. The pollution as well as the technology stocks depreciate but cumulate over
time. The technology reduces the need to pollute, and it can be interpreted as either
renewable energy sources or abatement technology.
While the model has a large number of subgame-perfect equilibria, the symmetric
Markov perfect equilibria (MPEs) are selected since they are simple and robust. With
this re￿nement, the equilibrium turns out to be unique and the analysis tractable, despite
the large number of stocks in the model. Since the equilibrium is unique, tacit agreements
enforced by trigger strategies are not feasible. But, by varying the countries￿ability to
negotiate, contract, and commit, and equilibrium contract is derived as a function of this
ability. Since the equilibrium agreement is also the constrained optimum, the results can
be interpreted normatively.
If all investments and emission levels were contractible, the ￿rst-best could be im-
1The two features characterize the current Kyoto Protocol as well as the 2009 Copenhagen Accord
and the 2010 Cancun Agreement. The Kyoto Protocol speci￿es emission reductions for the ￿ve-year
period 2008-12, while the Copenhagen Accord lists quanti￿ed targets for 2020. The Cancun Agreement,
in addition, has a subsection on how to facilitate technology transfers (http://cancun.unfccc.int/).
2plemented and the countries would negotiate and commit to the ￿rst-best actions in
equilibrium. At the other extreme, suppose all decisions are made noncooperatively. If
one country decides to pollute a lot, the other countries are induced to pollute less in the
future since the problem is then more severe. They will also invest more in technology
to be able to a⁄ord the necessary cuts in emissions. If a country decides to invest a
lot in abatement technology, it can be expected to pollute less in the future. This in-
duces the other countries to increase their emissions and reduce their own investments.
Anticipating these e⁄ects, each country pollutes more and invests less than it would in
an otherwise similar static model. The business-as-usual scenario is thus a particularly
harmful dynamic common-pool problem.
In reality, climate agreements are neither complete nor absent. While some actions
are negotiatable, others are not. To capture this, assume now the countries can negotiate
emission levels - at least for the near future - but not investments. This is a characteristic
of the Kyoto Protocol, and it pins down the countries￿contributions without specifying
whether a country complies by investing in a long-term solution rather than simply reduc-
ing current consumption.2 This assumption is also in line with the incomplete contract
theory literature, where investments are observable but not veri￿able by a third party
(Segal and Whinston, 2010). The result is hold-up problems at two levels. First, the
incentive to develop technology is low if intellectual property rights are weak. Second, a
government, considering to pay for such technology, may fear to be hold up by the others
when negotiating emission quotas.3 This setting generates several lessons for policy.
First, climate agreements can reduce welfare relative to business as usual. When
negotiations are anticipated, countries fear the hold-up problem, and the incentive to
invest is reduced. Consequently, everyone is worse o⁄, particularly if intellectual property
rights are weak, the length of the agreement is short, and the number of countries large.
Second, the optimal climate treaty is characterized. If the quotas are negotiated
before a country invests, it cannot be held up by the other countries - at least not before
2Golombek and Hoel (2006: 2) argue that "it would hardly be feasible for a country (or some inter-
national agency) to verify all aspects of other countries￿R&D policies."
3Financial Times reports that "Leaders of countries that want concessions say that nations like Den-
mark have a built-in advantage because they already depend more heavily on renewable energy" (October
17, 2008: A4).
3the agreement expires. Thus, countries invest more when the agreement is long-term.
Nevertheless, countries underinvest compared to the optimum if the agreement does not
last forever or if intellectual property rights are weak. To compensate and encourage
further investments, the best (and equilibrium) treaty is tougher (in that it stipulates
lower emissions) relative to what is optimal ex post (once the investments are sunk). The
weaker are the intellectual property rights, the tougher is the optimal (and equilibrium)
climate treaty.
The optimal length of the agreement is also characterized. On the one hand, a longer
time horizon is required to minimize the hold-up problem and to maximize the incentive
to invest in technology. On the other, the future marginal cost of pollution is uncertain
and stochastic in the model, and it is hard to guess on the ideal quotas in the far future.
The optimal length trades o⁄ these concerns. If intellectual property rights are weak, for
example, the optimal length increases.
The model can easily allow for technological trade, tari⁄s, or subsidies. With a high
tari⁄ on technological trade, or a low R&D subsidy, the incentive to invest is lower. As
a result, a short-term agreement is more likely to be worse than business as usual, since
short-term agreements are further reducing investments. The optimal climate agreement
is both tougher and more long-lasting if tari⁄s are high or subsidies low.
The optimal climate treaty is thus a function of trade policies, but the reverse is also
true: if the climate treaty is relatively short-term, it is more important to strengthen intel-
lectual property rights, reduce tari⁄s, and increase subsidies on investments. Negotiating
such trade policies is thus a strategic substitute for a tough climate agreement.4
By analyzing environmental agreements in a dynamic game permitting incomplete
contracts, I contribute to three strands of literature.
The literature on climate policy and environmental agreements is growing.5 While
Nordhaus (2006) criticizes the Kyoto Protocol for not being su¢ ciently inclusive, cost
e⁄ective, or ambitious, the current paper detects that, even without these weaknesses, this
4This argument is quite di⁄erent from the question of whether a general liberalization of trade improves
the environment (Copeland and Taylor, 2003; 2004).
5See Kolstad and Toman (2005) on climate policy and Barrett (2005) on environmental agreements.
Aldy et al. (2003) and Aldy and Stavins (2007; 2009) discuss alternative climate agreement designs.
4type of emission-agreement is fundamentally ￿ awed. The literature usually emphasizes
the positive e⁄ects of regulation on technological change,6 and a typical recommendation
is decade-long short-term agreements, partly to ensure ￿ exibility (see, for example, Karp
and Zhao, 2009). The present paper, in contrast, shows that short-term agreements reduce
the incentive to invest in new technology and can be worse than business as usual. This
builds on Buchholtz and Konrad (1994), who ￿rst noted that R&D might decrease prior to
negotiations.7 Beccherle and Tirole (2011) have recently generalized my one-period model
and shown that anticipating negotiations can have adverse e⁄ects also if the countries,
instead of investing, sell permits on the forward market, allow banking, or set production
standards. With only one period, however, these models miss dynamic e⁄ects and thus
the consequences for agreement design.
There is already a large literature on the private provision of public goods in dynamic
games.8 Since the evolving stock of public good in￿ uences the incentive to contribute,
the natural equilibrium concept is Markov perfect equilibrium and it is quite standard to
assume linear-quadratic functional forms.9 As in this paper, equilibrium provision levels
tend to be suboptimally low when private provisions are strategic substitutes (Fershtman
and Nitzan, 1991; Levhari and Mirman, 1980). There are often multiple MPEs, however,
so Dutta and Radner (2009), for example, investigate whether good equilibria, with little
pollution, can be sustained by the threat of reverting to a bad one. Few authors complicate
the model further by adding technological investments. Dutta and Radner (2004) is an
interesting exception, but since their costs of pollution and investment are both linear,
the equilibrium is ￿bang-bang￿where countries invest either zero or maximally in the
￿rst period, and never thereafter. The contribution of this paper is, ￿rst, to provide a
tractable model, with a unique MPE, in which agents invest as well as pollute over time.
Second, incomplete contracts are added to the model. Incomplete contracts are necessary
6See, e.g., Ja⁄e et al. (2003), Newell et al. (2006), Golombek and Hoel (2005). Even when investments
are made prior to negotiations, Muuls (2009) ￿nds that investments increase when the negotiations are
anticipated. Hoel and de Zeeuw (2010), in contrast, show that R&D can decrease if countries cooperate
because they then reduce pollution even without new technology, although there is no negotiation in their
model and their analysis hinges on a "breakthrough technology" and binary abatement levels.
7Analogously, Gatsios and Karp (1992) show how ￿rms may invest suboptimally prior to merger
negotiations.
8For treatments of di⁄erential games, see Ba‚ sar and Olsder (1999) or Dockner et al. (2000).
9For a comprehensive overview, see Engwerda (2005).
5when the question is how agreements on emissions a⁄ect the incentive to invest.10
By permitting contracts on emissions but not on investments, this paper is in line with
the literature on incomplete contracts (e.g., Hart and Moore, 1988). But the standard
model has only two stages and few papers study the optimal contract length. Harris and
Holmstrom (1987) discuss the length when contracts are costly to rewrite but uncertainty
about the future makes it necessary. To preserve the optimal incentives to invest, Guriev
and Kvasov (2005) argue that the agents should continuously renegotiate the length.
Ellman (2006) studies the optimal probability for continuing the contract and ￿nds that
it should be larger if speci￿c investments are important. This is somewhat related to
my result on how the optimal term increases in intellectual property rights. However,
Ellman permits only two agents, one investment period, and uncertainty is not revealed
over time. Finally, the result that short-term agreements can be worse than no agreement
is certainly at odds with the literature above, focusing on bilateral trade.
Several of the results generalize qualitatively. This is con￿rmed in the more technical
companion paper (Harstad, 2012), which allows for general functional forms, heteroge-
neous investment costs, and renegotiation. That paper, however, abstracts from uncer-
tainty, intellectual property rights, and trade policies, and it does not discuss short-term
agreements. Also, by specifying quadratic utility functions, the following analysis goes
further and describes when agreements are bene￿cial and how long they should last.
The model is presented in the next section. Section 3 presents the (complete con-
tracting) ￿rst-best outcome as well as the (noncooperative) business-as-usual scenario.
The fact that short-term agreements can be worse is shown in Section 4, while Section 5
characterizes the optimal agreement. Technological trade and trade policies are discussed
in Section 6, revealing a close connection between trade policies and climate agreements.
Section 7 discusses robustness and ￿nds that the results hold no matter whether side
transfers are available or the emission permits tradable. The ￿nal section concludes,
before the proofs follow in the Appendix.
10Few papers study policies in di⁄erential games: Hoel (1993) studies a di⁄erential game with an emis-
sion tax, Yanase (2006) derives the optimal contribution subsidy, Houba et al. (2000) analyze negotiations
over (￿sh) quotas lasting forever, while Sorger (2006) studies one-period agreements. Although Ploeg
and de Zeeuw (1992) even allow for R&D, contracts are either absent or complete in all these papers.
62. The Model
2.1. Payo⁄s and Pollution
Pollution is a public bad. Let G represent the stock of greenhouse gases, and assume







Parameter c > 0 measures the importance of climate change.
The stock of greenhouse gases G is measured relative to its "natural" level: G would,
were it not for emissions, tend to approach zero over time and 1 ￿ qG 2 [0;1] measures
the fraction of G that "depreciates" every period. The stock may nevertheless increase if
a country￿ s emission level gi is positive:
G = qGG￿ +
X
N
gi + ￿: (2.1)
By letting G￿ represent the stock of greenhouse gases in the previous period, subscripts
for periods can be skipped.
The shock ￿ is arbitrarily distributed with mean 0 and variance ￿2. It is quite realistic
to let the depreciation and accumulation of greenhouse gases be uncertain. The main
impact of ￿ is that it a⁄ects the marginal cost of pollution. In fact, the model is essentially
unchanged if the level of greenhouse gases is simply b G ￿ qGG￿+
P
N gi while the marginal
cost of pollution is stochastic and given by @C=@ b G = c￿ + cb G, where ￿ ￿ qG￿￿ + ￿.
For either formulation, a larger ￿ increases the marginal cost of emissions. Note that,
although ￿ is i.i.d. across periods, it has a long-lasting impact through its e⁄ect on G (or
on ￿). The additive form in equation (2.1) is standard in the literature.11
The bene￿t of polluting gi units is that country i can consume gi units of energy.
Country i may also be able to consume alternative or renewable energy, depending on its
stock of nuclear power, solar technology, or windmills. Let Ri measure this stock and the
11The additive form of the noise is standard in the literature on di⁄erential games (Ba‚ sar and Olsder,
1999: Section 6.4; Dockner et al., 2000, Section 8.2), particularly when using quadratic functions (Engw-
erda, 2005: Section 9.1). The additive form of qGG￿ and the assumption that qG 2 (0;1) is particularly
natural in pollution settings (Dutta and Radner, 2004 and 2009).
7amount of energy it can produce. The total amount of energy consumed is thus:
yi = gi + Ri, (2.2)
and the associated bene￿t for i is:





The bene￿t function is thus concave and increasing in yi up to i￿ s bliss point yi, which
can vary across countries. The bliss point represents the ideal energy level if there were
no concern for pollution: a country would never produce more than yi due to the implicit
costs of generating, transporting, and consuming energy. The average yi is denoted y.
Parameter b > 0 measures the importance of energy.
The green technology can alternatively be interpreted as abatement technology. Sup-
pose Ri measures the amount by which i can at no cost reduce (or clean) its potential
emissions. If energy production, measured by yi, is generally polluting, the actual emis-
sion level of country i is given by gi = yi ￿ Ri, implying (2.2), as before. The additive
form of (2.2) has also been adopted elsewhere in the literature.12
2.2. Technology and Time
The technology stock Ri may change over time. On the one hand, the technology might
depreciate at the expected rate of 1￿qR 2 [0;1]. On the other, if ri measures country i￿ s
investment in the current period, then:
Ri = qRRi;￿ + ri:
As described by Figure 1, the investment stages and the pollution stages alternate over
time.13 Without loss of generality, de￿ne "a period" to start with the investment stage
and end with the pollution stage. In between, ￿ is realized. Information is symmetric at
all stages.
12See, for example, Roussillon and Schweinzer (2010), analyzing how investment-contests can be de-
signed to implement the ￿rst￿ best. If, instead, the model focused on technologies that reduced the
emission content of each produced unit (as in Dutta and Radner, 2004), the below analysis would be
8Figure 2.1: Figure 1: The investment and emission stages alternate over time
The cost of an invested unit is K. Thus, country i￿ s ￿ ow utility is:
ui = Bi (yi) ￿ C (G) ￿ Kri; (2.4)
and a country￿ s objective is to maximize the present-discounted value of its utilities, i.e.,






where ￿ is the common discount factor.
Section 5 allows the investments to be veri￿able, contractible, and subsidizable. But
in most of this paper, the investments are assumed to be observable but not veri￿able by
third parties. This is in line with the literature on incomplete contracts and may lead to
hold-up problems at the international as well as at the national level.
At the international level, it is di¢ cult for countries to negotiate and contract on
investment levels. If a country has promised to reduce gi, it can comply by reducing
its short-term consumption or by investing in more long-lasting technology. The di⁄er-
ence may be hard to detect by third parties. Therefore, if a country has promised to
invest a certain amount, it may be tempted to report other public expenditures as such
investments. These problems may explain why the Kyoto Protocol has speci￿ed emission
quotas, but not investment levels.
much harder.
13This assumption can be endogenized. Suppose the countries can invest at any time in the interval
[t ￿ 1;t], where t and t+1 denote emission stages, but that the investment must take place at least ￿ < 1
units (measured as a fraction of the period-length) before time t, for the technology to be e⁄ective at
time t. Then, all countries will invest at time t ￿ ￿, never at time t ￿ 1.
9At the national level, a government purchasing technology may ￿nd it di¢ cult to
describe the exact requirements in advance. An innovator or entrepreneur will need to
develop the technology ￿rst, and then hope the government is willing to pay for it. Let
￿ 2 (0;1] be the fraction of the government￿ s bene￿t that the innovator can capture. If
the innovator sets the price, ￿ represents the innovators￿intellectual property right, i.e.,
the fraction of an investment that is protectable for the innovator, while the fraction 1￿￿
is available for the government to copy for free.14 Alternatively, ￿ may represent the
innovator￿ s bargaining power.15 In any case, investments take place until a government￿ s
marginal bene￿t, multiplied by ￿, equals the cost of investment, K:
@






With free entry, innovators earn zero pro￿t, charge the price K, and the government￿ s
utility is given by (2.4).
The model is more general than might at ￿rst appear: If the government is innovating
in-house or intellectual property rights are fully enforced, then ￿ = 1 and all the following
results continue to hold. If the developers of technology are located in foreign countries,
the model is unchanged, since such ￿rms earn zero pro￿t in any case. If an innovator can
sell (or license) its ideas to several countries at the same time, let K represent the private
cost of developing technology that has the potential to raise
P
N Ri by one unit, and the
analysis below needs only small modi￿cations. The previous version of the paper allowed
for technological spillovers, and a larger spillover has the same e⁄ect as a smaller ￿. The
bliss points yi can change over time without the need to change the analysis. Tari⁄s and
subsidies on technological trade are discussed in Section 6, while Section 7 shows that
all results continue to hold if quotas are tradable and no matter whether side transfers
are allowed at the bargaining stage. The more technical companion paper (Harstad,
2012) deals with non-quadratic Bi (:) and C (:) functions, nonlinear and heterogeneous
investment costs, continuous time, renegotiation, and it derives conditions under which
14This is a slight modi￿cation of Acemoglu, Antras, and Helpman (2007). In their model, ￿ is the
fraction of the tasks for which e⁄ort can be speci￿ed.
15If the innovator and the government were bargaining over the price, the innovator would be able to
capture the fraction b ￿ ￿ ￿￿, where ￿ 2 (0;1] is the innovator￿ s share of the bargaining surplus (and thus
represents its bargaining power) after the government has copied the fraction 1￿￿ for free. In this case,
all the results below continue to hold if only ￿ is replaced by b ￿.
10the results would hold if technologies and emission levels had to be nonnegative. This
paper, in contrast, does not require gi and ri to be non-negative. In practice, a negative
gi is possible if carbon-capture is allowed, while a negative ri would be possible if e.g.
the technology could be employed for other purposes. Imposing nonnegativity constraints
would complicate the analysis but not change the results under certain conditions.
2.3. De￿nition of an Equilibrium
There is typically a large number of subgame-perfect equilibria in dynamic games, and
re￿nements are necessary. This paper focuses on Markov perfect equilibria (MPEs) where
strategies are conditioned only on the pay-o⁄ relevant stocks (G and R ￿ fR1;:::;Rng).
There are several reasons for selecting these equilibria. First, experimental evidence
suggests that players tend toward Markov perfect strategies rather than supporting the
best subgame perfect equilibrium (Battaglini et al., 2010). Second, Markov perfect strate-
gies are simple, since they do not depend on the history in arbitrary ways.16 This simpli￿es
the analysis as well. Third, the unique MPE coincides with the unique subgame-perfect
equilibrium if time were ￿nite but approached in￿nity.17 This is particularly important in
our context, since the equilibrium is then robust to the introduction of real-world aspects
that would make the e⁄ective time horizon ￿nite. For example, since fossil fuel is an
exhaustible resource, the emission game may indeed have a ￿nite time horizon in the real
world. Similarly, politicians￿term-limits or short time horizon may force them to view
time as expiring. Fourth, focusing on the MPEs is quite standard when studying games
with stocks. By doing the same in this paper, its contribution to the literature is clari￿ed.
Fifth, in contrast to much of the literature, there is a unique MPE in the present game.
This sharpens the predictions and makes institutional comparisons possible. Finally, since
the unique MPE makes it impossible to enforce agreements by using trigger strategies,
it becomes meaningful to focus instead on settings where countries can negotiate and
16Maskin and Tirole (2001:192-3) defend MPEs since they are "often quite successful in eliminating
or reducing a large multiplicity of equilibria," and they "prescribe the simplest form of behavior that is
consistent with rationality" while capturing that "bygones are bygones more completely than does the
concept of subgame-perfect equilibrium."
17This can easily be seen by the recursive nature of the proofs. Fudenberg and Tirole (1991:533) suggest
that "one might require in￿nite-horizon MPE to be limits of ￿nite-horizon MPE."
11contract on emission levels - at least for the near future. By varying the possibilities to
negotiate and contract, I derive a unique equilibrium for each situation.18
At the negotiation stage, I assume the bargaining outcome is e¢ cient and symmetric if
it should happen that the game and the payo⁄s are symmetric. This condition is satis￿ed
whether we rely on (i) the Nash Bargaining Solution, with or without side transfers,
(ii) the Shapley value, or instead (iii) noncooperative bargaining where one country is
randomly selected to make a take-it-or-leave-it o⁄er specifying quotas and side payments.
Thus, the condition is quite weak. Note that all countries participate in equilibrium, since
there is no stage at which they can close the door to negotiations.
3. Benchmarks
3.1. Solution Method
While the n+1 stocks in the model is a threat to its tractability, the analysis is simpli￿ed
by two of the model￿ s deliberately chosen features. First, one can utilize the additive form
in (2.2). By substituting (2.2) into (2.1), we get:
G = qGG￿ + ￿ +
X
N








e yi ￿ yi + y ￿ yi: (3.3)
Together with ui = ￿b(y ￿ e yi)
2 =2 ￿ cG2=2 ￿ Kri, the Ris as well as the yis are
eliminated from the model: they are payo⁄-irrelevant as long as R is given, and i￿ s Markov
perfect strategy for e yi or ri is thus not conditioned on them.19 A country￿ s continuation
value Ui is thus a function of only G￿ and R￿ and we can therefore write it as U (G￿;R￿),
without the subscript i.
18This paper does not attempt to explain why countries comply with their promises, but one possibility
is that the treaty must be rati￿ed domestically and that certain stakeholders have incentives to sue the
government unless it complies.
19That is, there is no reason for one player to condition its strategy on Ri, if the other players are
not doing it. Thus, ruling out dependence on Ri is in line with the de￿nition by Maskin and Tirole
(2001:202), where Markov strategies are measurable with respect to the coarsest partition of histories
consistent with rationality.
12Second, the linear investment cost is utilized to prove that the continuation value must
be linear in R and, it turns out, in G. Naturally, this simpli￿es the analysis tremendously,
and it leads to a unique symmetric MPE for each scenario analyzed below.20
Proposition 0. (i) There is a unique symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium for every
contracting environment analyzed below.










This result is referred to as Proposition 0 since it is the foundation for the propositions
emphasized below. It holds for every scenario analyzed below, and it is proven in the
Appendix when solving for each case.
3.2. The First-Best
If investments as well as emissions were contractible, the countries would agree to the
￿rst-best outcome. This follows from the observation (made in the previous subsection)
that the bargaining game is symmetric, even if the Ris or the yis would di⁄er, and the
outcome is thus e¢ cient, as required in Section 2.3. The bargaining outcome would then
coincide to the case where a benevolent planner made all decisions in order to maximize
the sum of utilities.




i (R) = yi ￿ Ri ￿
cn(ny + qGG￿ + ￿ ￿ R) + ￿qG (1 ￿ ￿qR)K
b + cn2 . (3.4)
20As the proposition states, this is the unique symmetric MPE. Since the investment cost is linear,
there also exist asymmetric MPEs in which the countries invest di⁄erent amounts (these are analyzed in
Harstad, 2012).
13(ii) The ￿rst-best investments, given ￿rst-best emission levels, are:
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b + cn2￿: (3.5)
3.3. Business as Usual
The other extreme scenario is where neither emissions nor investments are negotiated.
This noncooperative situation is referred to as business as usual.
Proposition 2. With business as usual, countries pollute too much and invest too little:
r
bau
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The ￿rst inequality in (3.7) states that each country pollutes too much compared to
the ￿rst-best levels, conditional on the investments. A country is not internalizing the
cost for the others.
Furthermore, note that country i pollutes less if the existing level of pollution is large
and if i possesses good technology, but more if the other countries￿technology level is
large, since they are then expected to pollute less.
In fact, yi ￿Ri ￿gbau
i = yi ￿yi is the same across countries, in equilibrium, no matter
what the di⁄erences in technology are. While perhaps surprising at ￿rst, the intuition
is straightforward. Every country has the same preference (and marginal utility) when
it comes to reducing its consumption level relative to its bliss point, and the marginal
impact on G is also the same for every country: one more energy unit generates one
unit of emissions. The technology is already utilized to the fullest possible extent, and
producing more energy is going to pollute.
14Therefore, a larger R, which reduces G, must increase every yi. This implies that if Ri
increases but Rj, j 6= i, is constant, then gj = yj￿Rj must increase. In words: if a country
has a better technology, it pollutes less but (because of this) all other countries pollute
more. Clearly, this e⁄ect reduces the willingness to pay for technology, and generates
another reason why investments are suboptimally low, reinforcing the impact of the weak
intellectual property rights. The suboptimal investments make it optimal to pollute more,
implying the second inequality in (3.7) and a second reason for why pollution is higher
than its ￿rst-best level.
In sum, a country may want to invest less in order to induce other countries to pollute
less and to invest more in the following period. In addition, countries realize that if G￿ is
large for a given R, (3.7) implies that the gis must decrease. Thus, a country may want to
pollute more today to induce others to pollute less (and invest more) in the future. These
dynamic considerations make this dynamic common-pool problem more severe than its
static counterpart.
4. Harmful (Short-Term) Agreements
If countries can commit to the immediate but not the distant future, they may negotiate a
"short-term" agreement. If the agreement is truly short-term, it is di¢ cult to develop new
technology during the time-span of the agreement and the relevant technology is given by
earlier installations. This interpretation of short-term agreements can be captured by the
timing shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2: The timing for short-term agreements
15Technically, negotiating the gis is equivalent to negotiating the e yis as long as the Ris
are sunk and observable (even if they are not veri￿able). Just as in Section 3.1, (3.1)-
(3.2) imply that the Ris are payo⁄-irrelevant, given R. Even if countries have di⁄erent
Ris, they face the same marginal bene￿ts and costs of reducing yi relative to yi, whether
negotiations succeed or not. Symmetry thus implies that e yi is the same for every country
in the bargaining outcome, while e¢ ciency requires the e yis to be optimal. Consequently,
the emission levels are equal to the ￿rst-best, conditional on past investments.
Intuitively, if country i has better technology, its marginal bene￿t from polluting is
smaller, and i is polluting less with business as usual. This gives i a poor bargaining
position, and the other countries can o⁄er i a smaller emission quota. At the same time,
the other countries negotiate larger quotas for themselves, since the smaller gi (and the
smaller G) reduces the marginal cost of polluting. Anticipating this hold-up problem,
every country is discouraged from investing. This international hold-up problem provides
a second reason why investments are suboptimally low, in addition to the domestic hold-
up problem that arises when ￿ < 1.
Consequently, although emission levels are ex post optimal, actual emissions are larger
compared to the ￿rst-best levels since the two hold-up problems discourage investments
and make it ex post optimal to pollute more.
Proposition 3. With short-term agreements, countries pollute the optimal amount, given

































Deriving and describing this outcome is relatively simple because Proposition 0 contin-
ues to hold for this case, as proven in the Appendix. In particular, UG and UR are exactly
the same as with business as usual. This does not imply that U itself is identical in the
two cases: the levels can be di⁄erent. But this does imply that when deriving actions
and utilities for one period, it is irrelevant whether there will also be a short-term agree-
ment in the next (or any future) period. This makes it convenient to compare short-term
16agreements to business as usual. For example, such a comparison will be independent of
the stocks, since UG and UR are identical in the two cases.
By comparison, the pollution level is indeed less under short-term agreements than un-
der business as usual. For welfare, however, it is also important to know how investments
di⁄er in the two cases.












































￿ (1 ￿ ￿qR)
2 > ￿
2 (b + c)(bcn=K)
2
(b + cn2)(b + cn)
2: (4.1)
Rather than being encouraging, short-term agreements discourage investments. The
reason is the following. First, the hold-up problem is exactly as strong as the crowding-
out problem in the noncooperative equilibrium; in either case, each country enjoys only
1=n of the total bene￿t generated by its investments. In addition, when an agreement
is expected, everyone anticipates that the pollution will be lower. A further decline in
emissions, made possible by new technology, is then less valuable. Hence, each country is
willing to pay less for technology.21
Since investments decrease under short-term agreements, utilities can decrease as well.
This is the case, in particular, if investments are important because they are already well
below the optimal level. Thus, short-term agreements are bad if intellectual property
rights are weak (￿ small), the number of countries is large, and the period for which
the agreement lasts is very short. If the period is short, ￿ and qR are large, while the
uncertainty from one period to the next, determined by ￿, is likely to be small. All changes
make (4.1) reasonable, and it always holds when the period is very short (￿ ! 0).
21A counter-argument is that, if an agreement is expected, it becomes more important to invest to
ensure a decent energy consumption level. This force turns out to be smaller in the model above.
175. The Optimal (Long-Term) Agreement
The hold-up problem under short-term agreements arises because the gis are negotiated
after investments are made. If the time horizon of an agreement is longer, however, it
is possible for countries to develop technologies within the time frame of the agreement.
The other countries are then unable to hold up the investing country, since the quotas
have already been agreed to, at least for the near future.
To analyze such long-term agreements, let the countries negotiate and commit to
emission quotas for T periods. The next subsection studies equilibrium investment, as a
function of such an agreement. Taking this function into account, the second subsection
derives the optimal (and equilibrium) emission quotas, given T. Finally, the optimal T is
characterized.
If the agreement is negotiated just before the emission stage in period 0, then the
quotas and investments for that period are given by Proposition 3. For the subsequent
periods, it is irrelevant whether the quotas are negotiated before the ￿rst emission stage, or
instead at the start of the next period, since no information is revealed, and no strategic
decisions are made, in between. To avoid repeating earlier results, I will focus on the
subsequent periods, and thus implicitly assume that the T-period agreement is negotiated
at the start of period 1, as described by Figure 3.
Figure 3: The timing for long-term agreements
5.1. Equilibrium Investments depend on the Agreement
When investing in period t 2 f1;2;:::;Tg, countries take the quotas as given. A country
is willing to pay more for innovations and investments if its quota, gi;t, is small, since it
18is going to be very costly to comply if the sum yi;t = gi;t +Ri;t is also small. Anticipating
this, innovations and investments decrease in gi;t.
Nevertheless, compared to the investments that are ￿rst-best conditional on the quo-
tas, r￿
i;t (gi;t), equilibrium investments are too low for two reasons. First, the innovators
fear to be held up if ￿ < 1, and thus they invest only up to the point where the countries￿
willingness to pay for ￿ units equals the cost of developing one unit of technology. Second,
a country anticipates that having good technology will worsen its bargaining position in
the future, once a new agreement is to be negotiated. At that stage, having good technol-
ogy leads to a lower gi;t since the other countries can hold up country i when it is cheap
for i to reduce its emissions.22 Anticipating this, countries invest less in the last period,
particularly if that period is short (￿ large), the technology long-lasting (qR large), and
the number of countries large (n large).
Proposition 5. Equilibrium investments are:
(i) decreasing in the quota gi;t and increasing in the intellectual property right ￿;
(ii) less than the e¢ cient level, r￿
i;t (gi;t), if ￿ < 1, for any given quota and period;
(iii) less in the last period than in earlier periods if ￿qR > 0:














for t = T
￿ (strict if ￿qR > 0)










for t < T
￿ (strict if ￿ < 1)
r
￿
i;t (gi;t) = yi ￿ qRRi;￿ ￿ gi;t ￿ (1 ￿ ￿qR)K=b:
5.2. The Optimal Quotas





where Rlt is the equilibrium technology vector under long-term agreements. However,
the countries anticipate that the negotiated gi;ts are going to in￿ uence investments in
22Or, if no agreement is expected in the future, a large Ri;T+1 reduces gi;T+1 and increases gj;T+1, as
proven in Section 3.3.
19technology: the smaller the quotas, the larger the investments. Thus, since the invest-
ments are suboptimally low, the countries have an incentive to commit to quotas that




, to further encourage investments. The
smaller equilibrium investments are compared to the optimal investments, the lower are
the negotiated gi;ts, compared to the quotas that are ex post optimal.
Proposition 6. (i) The negotiated quotas are strictly smaller than the ex post optimal









b + cn2 for t < T: (5.1)
(ii) For the last period, the negotiated quotas are strictly smaller than the ex post optimal








1=￿ ￿ 1 + ￿qR (1 ￿ 1=n)
b + cn2 for t = T: (5.2)





. This makes the agreement more demanding or tougher to satisfy
at the emission stage. The purpose of such a seemingly overambitious agreement is to
encourage investments, since these are suboptimally low when ￿ is small. Encouraging
investments is especially important in the last period, since investments are particularly
low then, according to Proposition 5. Thus, the optimal agreement is tougher to satisfy
over time.23
On the other hand, if ￿ = ￿qR = 0, the last terms of (5.1)-(5.2) are zero, meaning that
the commitments under the best long-term agreement also maximize the expected utility
ex post. In this case, there are no underinvestments, and there is no need to distort gi;ts
downwards.24
23This conclusion would be strengthened if the quotas were negotiated just before the emission stage
in the ￿rst period. Then, the ￿rst-period quotas would be ex post optimal since these quotas would, in
any case, have no impact on investments. It is easy to show that these quotas are expected to be larger
than the quotas described by Proposition 6 - whether or not this is conditioned on investment levels.
24Interestingly, the equilibrium quotas, as described by Proposition 6, are in fact equal to the ￿rst-best
emission levels if investments had been ￿rst-best:
gi;t = Eg￿
i (R￿):
205.3. The Optimal Length
If the countries are able to make commitments for any future period, they can negotiate
the agreement-length, T. Since, as noted before, the countries are symmetric at the
negotiation stage (no matter di⁄erences in Ris or yis), they will agree on the optimal T.
This trades o⁄ two concerns. On the one hand, investments are particularly low at the
end of the agreement, before a new agreement is to be negotiated. This hold-up problem
arises less frequently, and is delayed, if T is large. On the other hand, the stochastic
shocks cumulate over time, and they a⁄ect the future marginal costs of pollution. This
makes it hard to estimate the optimal quotas for the future, particularly when T is large.
In general, the optimal length of an agreement depends on the regime that is expected
to replace it. This is in contrast to the other contracts studied above, which have been
independent of the future regime. When the time horizon is chosen, it is better to commit
to a longer-term agreement if everyone expects that, once it expires, the new regime is
going to be bad (e.g., business as usual).
On the other hand, if future as well as present negotiators are able to commit to future
emissions, then we can anticipate that the next agreement is also going to be optimal.
Under this assumption, the optimal term is derived and characterized in the Appendix.




















(ii) Under this condition, T ￿ decreases in ￿, b, c, and ￿, but increases in n, qR, and K.
If ￿ were known or contractible, the optimal agreement would last forever. Otherwise,
the length of the agreement should be shorter if future marginal costs are uncertain
(￿ large) and important (c large). On the other hand, a larger T is preferable if the
underinvestment problem is severe. This is the case if the intellectual property rights are
When selecting the optimal quotas, there is, as noted, good reasons for selecting small quotas in order to
induce investments. As a counter-argument, the suboptimally low investments make it ex post optimal
to permit larger emission levels. These two e⁄ects turn out to cancel, the Appendix shows. The technical
reason is that, in this equilibrium as well as in the ￿rst-best outcome, yi is independent of gi, so a smaller
gi is only reducing G and increasing Ri. Since the marginal cost of increasing Ri is constant, the optimal
G is the same in this equilibrium and in the ￿rst-best outcome.
21weak (￿ small), the technology is long-lasting (qR large), and the number of countries
large. If b is large while K is small, then consuming the right amount of energy is more
important than the concern for future bargaining power. The hold-up problem is then
relatively small, and the optimal T declines.
6. Trade and R&D Policies
So far, investments in technology have been noncontractible. But since, as a consequence,
investments were suboptimally low, the countries have incentives to search for ways by
which investments can be subsidized. This section allows for such subsidies and shows
that the framework continues to provide important lessons.
Let the parameter ￿ be an ad valorem subsidy captured by the innovator or developer
of technology. It may denote the share of research expenses borne by the government
(as in Grossman and Helpman, 1991). As before, K is the cost of increasing Ri by one
unit, while ￿ 2 (0;1] is the fraction of the purchaser￿ s bene￿t that can be captured by
the seller. With free entry of innovators, the equilibrium investments will be given by the
following condition (replacing (2.5)):
@
Bi (￿) ￿ C (￿) + ￿Ui;+ (￿)
@Ri
=
K (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
. (6.1)
If the typical developer of technology for one country is located abroad, then ￿ can be
interpreted as an import subsidy. If ￿ < 0, then ￿￿ may be interpreted as an import
tari⁄.25
The Appendix analyzes each scenario as a function of ￿. As suggested by (6.1), the
e⁄ect of ￿ is similar to the e⁄ect of ￿. If the subsidy is exogenous and low, or the tari⁄is
25Technically, this requires the tari⁄, or the import subsidy, to be proportional to the cost of developing
technology. If, instead, the import subsidy b ￿, or the tari⁄ ￿b ￿, were proportional to the sales value, (6.1)
should be:
@






1 + b ￿
￿:
Alternatively, with an estate subsidy e ￿, or tari⁄ ￿e ￿, (6.1) should be:
@






In these cases, the e⁄ects of b ￿ and e ￿ would be similar to the e⁄ects of ￿.
22high, then investments decline. A further reduction in investment is then particularly bad,
which implies that short-term agreements are worse than business as usual. To encourage
more investments, the best climate agreement is tougher and longer-term.
Proposition 8. If the subsidy ￿ is low or the tari⁄ ￿￿ is high, then:
(i) short-term agreements are worse relative to business as usual;
(ii) the optimal agreement is tougher and longer-term.
While Proposition 8 shows that the optimal climate treaty depends on the policy
parameters, we may also ask the reverse question: What is the best ￿ and/or ￿, as a
function of the climate policy?
Proposition 9. The optimal subsidy ￿ and intellectual property right ￿ are larger if the
agreement is short-term or absent. They are given by:
(i) Equation (6.2) for short-term agreements as well as for business as usual;
(ii) Equation (6.3) for a long-term agreement￿ s last period;





bau = 1 ￿ ￿=n > (6.2)
￿
￿
lt;T = 1 ￿ ￿[1 ￿ ￿qR (1 ￿ 1=n)] > (6.3)
￿
￿
lt;t = 1 ￿ ￿; t < T: (6.4)
If the climate treaty is short-term, the hold-up problem is larger and it is more im-
portant to encourage investments by protecting intellectual property rights, subsidizing
technological trade, and reducing tari⁄s. Such trade agreements are thus strategic substi-
tutes for climate treaties: weakening cooperation in one area makes further cooperation
in the other more important. As before, the optimal agreement is also going to be the
equilibrium when the countries negotiate, since they are symmetric at the negotiation
stage (w.r.t. yi ￿ yi;t) no matter what their technological di⁄erences are.
If the subsidy can be freely chosen and set in line with Proposition 9, short-term agree-
ments are actually ￿rst-best: while the optimal subsidy induces ￿rst-best investments, the
negotiated emission levels are also ￿rst-best, conditional on the investments. Long-term
agreements are never ￿rst-best, however, due to the stochastic and non-contractible ￿.
23Proposition 10. If ￿ and ￿ can be set according to Proposition 9, short-term agreements
implement the ￿rst-best outcome, but long-term agreements do not.
7. Policy Instruments and Robustness
This paper has focused on the interaction between investments in technology and climate
agreements on emissions. To isolate these e⁄ects, the model abstracted from a range
of real-world complications. While some assumptions have been crucial for the results,
others can easily be relaxed.
First, note that in every bargaining situation above, the countries are identical when
considering e yi and ri, no matter di⁄erences in the yis or in the Ris. Thus, side transfers
would be used neither on, nor o⁄, the equilibrium path.
Proposition 11. Propositions 0-10 survive whether or not side payments are available
at the negotiation stage.
Second, the discussion above has ignored trade in pollution permits. However, if the
allowances were tradable, no trade would take place in equilibrium, and the possibility
for such trade (o⁄ the equilibrium path) would not change the equilibrium investments
or emission quotas.
Proposition 12. Suppose the emission allowances are tradable.
(i) Propositions 0-11 survive.
(ii) The equilibrium permit prices under short-term agreements (pst), the last-period of
long-term agreements (pT), the earlier periods of long-term agreements (pt), and at the

























￿ (strict if ￿ < 1)
p￿ = K (1 ￿ ￿qR):
24Interestingly, the permit price increases toward the end of the agreement. Then,
investments in green technology decline and the demand for being allowed to pollute goes
up. However, even at t < T, the permit price is higher than it would have been at the
￿rst best (i.e., if investments were contractible). The reason is that the agreement is
tougher than what is ex post optimal in order to motivate investments when ￿ < 1. The
expected price is highest for short-term agreements, since the technology stock is then
small and so is the negotiated energy consumption. For each scenario, the equilibrium
permit price is larger if intellectual property rights are weak. If there is a subsidy or
tari⁄ on technological trade, as in the previous section, then 1=￿ should be replaced by
(1 ￿ ￿)=￿: the smaller is the investment subsidy, or the larger is the tari⁄, the higher is
the equilibrium permit price at the optimal and equilibrium agreement.
The model above is stylized and a number of assumptions are made: the bene￿t and
cost of pollution are quadratic, the investment cost is linear and identical across countries,
renegotiation is impossible, and I have not imposed nonnegativity constraints on emissions
or investments. All these assumptions are relaxed in the more technical companion paper
(Harstad, 2012), and many of the results are shown to generalize.26
Future research may relax other assumptions as well. For example, the model above
has predicted full participation in a climate treaty. This followed since there was no stage
at which countries could opt out of the negotiation process. If such a stage were added
to the model, free-riding may emerge. For example, in the one-period model analyzed by
Barrett (2005), only three countries participate in equilibrium when utility functions are
quadratic. One may conjecture, however, that the number could be larger in a dynamic
model, like the one above: If just a few countries decided to participate, they may ￿nd
it optimal to negotiate short-term agreements, rather than long-term agreements, in the
hope that the nonparticipants will join later. Since the participants invest less under
short-term agreements, this credible threat might discourage countries when considering
to free-ride.
26Note, however, that Harstad (2012) rules out uncertainty and incomplete property rights, and it
studies neither the harmful short-term agreements nor the optimal term of an agreement.
258. Conclusions
While mitigating climate change will require emission reduction as well as the development
of new technology, recent agreements have focused on short-term emissions. What is the
value of such an agreement? How does it in￿ uence the incentive to invest, and what is
the best agreement? To address these questions, this paper provides a framework where
countries over time both pollute and invest in environmentally friendly technologies. The
analysis generates a number of important lessons.
First, the noncooperative outcome is particularly bad. With business as usual, coun-
tries pollute too much, not only because they fail to internalize the externality, but also
because polluting now motivates the other countries to pollute less and invest more in
the future. Similarly, each county invests too little in technology, to induce the other
countries to invest more and pollute less.
Second, short-term agreements can, nevertheless, be worse. At the negotiation stage,
a country with good technology is going to be hold up by the others, requiring it to reduce
its pollution a great deal. Anticipating this, countries invest less when negotiations are
coming up. This makes the countries worse o⁄ relative to business as usual, particularly
if the agreement has a short duration and intellectual property rights are poorly enforced.
Third, the optimal agreement is described. A tough agreement, if long-term, encour-
ages investments. The optimal and equilibrium agreement is tougher and longer-term if,
for example, technologies are long-lasting and intellectual property rights weak.
Finally, trade policies and climate treaties interact. If technologies can be traded or
subsidized, high tari⁄s and low subsidies discourage investments and, to counteract this,
the climate treaty should be tougher and longer-term. If the climate treaty is absent
or relatively short-lasting for exogenous reasons, then tari⁄s should decrease, intellectual
property rights should be strengthened, and investments or trade in green technology
should be subsidized. Negotiating such trade policies is thus a strategic substitute to a
tough climate treaty: if one fails, the other is more important.
269. Appendix
The following proofs allow for the subsidy ￿, introduced in Section 5; Propositions 0-6
follows by setting ￿ = 0. To shorten equations, de￿ne m ￿ ￿￿@Ui=@G￿, z ￿ ￿@Ui=@R￿,
e R ￿ qRR￿, e G ￿ qGG￿ + ￿ and e yi ￿ yi + y ￿ yi, where y ￿
P
N yi=n. While Ui is the
continuation value for a subgame starting with the investment stage, let Wi represent the
(interrim) continuation value at (or just before) the emission stage.
Proof of Proposition 0 for the business-as-usual scenario. Just before the emission
stage, ￿ is known and the payo⁄-relevant states are R and e G.27 A country￿ s (interrim)











K (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
, (9.1)
where expectations are taken w.r.t. ￿. The second-order condition holds because EW
is concave. This implies, since the marginal cost of increasing R is constant, that the
equilibrium R must be independent of R￿. Thus, when all countries invest the same, a








At the emission stage, a country￿ s ￿rst-order condition for yi is:





e yj ￿ R
!




implying that all e yis are identical. The second-order condition holds trivially. From (9.2),
we know that URG = UGR = 0, and UG cannot be a function of R. Therefore, (9.3) implies
that e yi, G and thus B (e yi ￿ y) ￿ C (G) ￿ ￿ (:) are functions of e G ￿ R only. Hence, write
G = ￿
￿
e G ￿ R
￿
. Then, (9.1) becomes:
@E[￿ (qGG￿ + ￿ ￿ R) + ￿U (￿(qGG￿ + ￿ ￿ R);R)]
@R
= k: (9.4)
This requires qGG￿￿R to be a constant, say ￿, which is independent of the stocks. Thus,
@ri=@G￿ = qG=n and U becomes:
U (G￿;R￿) = E￿ (￿ + ￿) ￿ Kr + E￿U (￿(￿ + ￿);R)
= E￿ (￿ + ￿) ￿ K
￿
qGG￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ qRR￿
n
￿











27As explained in Section 3, there is no reason for one country, or one ￿rm, to condition its strategy
on Ri, given R, if the other players are not doing it. Ruling out such dependence is consistent with the
de￿nition of Markov and Tirole (2001).
27With UG and UR pinned down, (9.3) and (9.4) give a unique solution. QED
Proof of Proposition 1. Since the proof is analogous to the next proof, it is omitted
here but included in the working paper version and available on request.
Proof of Proposition 2. From (9.3),
e yi = y ￿
m + cG
b
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gi = yi ￿ Ri = yi ￿
cyn + c
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Simple algebra and a comparison to the ￿rst-best gives (3.7). Interrim utility (after


























Since @G=@R = ￿b=(b + cn) from (9.6), equilibrium investments are given by:
k = E@W
bau













The second-order condition holds since EW is concave. Taking expectations of G in (9.6),
substituting in (9.7) and solving for R gives:






























Simple algebra and a comparison to the ￿rst-best gives (3.6). QED
Proof of Proposition 3. At the emission stage, the countries negotiate the gis. gi
determines e yi, and since countries have symmetric preferences over e yi (in the negotiations
as well as in the default outcome), the e yis must be identical in the bargaining outcome
and e¢ ciency requires:
0 = b(y ￿ e yi)=n ￿ c
￿




+ ￿UG(e G ￿ R +
X
e yi;R): (9.9)
The rest of the proof of Proposition 0 continues to hold: R will be a function of G￿ only,
so UR￿ = qRK=n. This makes Ee G ￿ R a constant and UG￿ = ￿qG (1 ￿ ￿qR)K=n, just as
28before. The comparative static becomes the same, but the levels of gi, yi, ri, ui and Ui
are obviously di⁄erent from the previous case.
The ￿rst-order condition (9.9) becomes:
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byn ￿ mn2 + b
￿
e G ￿ R
￿
b + cn2 . (9.10)











































= cEG + m + z: (9.11)
The second-order condition holds since EW is concave. Substituted in (9.10), after taking
the expectation of it, and solving for R, gives
R















The proof is completed by comparing r￿
i to rst
i = (Rst ￿ qRR￿)=n:
r
st




























Proof of Proposition 4. Part (i) and (ii) follow from simple algebra when comparing
emissions and investments for business as usual to short-term agreements. Substituted in
ui, which in turn should be substituted in U = ui+￿U+ (:), we can compare Ubau and Ust
(the steps are available on request and in the working paper version). QED
Proof of Proposition 5. In the last period, investments are given by:
k = b(gi;T + Ri;T ￿ yi) + z )
e yi ￿ y = ￿
k ￿ z
b








29Anticipating the equilibrium Ri;T, i can invest qR less units in period T for each invested
unit in period T ￿ 1. Thus, in period T ￿ 1, equilibrium investments are given by:28
k = b(gi;T￿1 + Ri;T￿1 ￿ yi) + ￿qRK ) (9.14)








The same argument applies to every period T ￿ t, t 2 f1;:::T ￿ 1g, and the investment
level is given by the analogous equation for each period but T. Proposition 5 follows since





i + qRRi;￿ = yi ￿ gi ￿
K (1 ￿ ￿qR)
b
: QED
Proof of Proposition 6. If the negotiations fail, the default outcome is the noncoop-
erative outcome, giving everyone the same utility. Since the ris follow from the gis in
(9.13), negotiating the gis is equivalent to negotiating the ris. All countries have identical
preferences w.r.t. the ris (and their default utility is the same), so symmetry requires
that ri, and thus &t ￿ yi ￿ gi;t ￿ qRRi;t￿1, is the same for every country in equilibrium.
For the last period, (9.13) becomes









￿ EC (G) ￿ Kri;T + ￿U (G;R):
E¢ ciency requires Ui to be maximized w.r.t. & recognizing gi = yi ￿ qRRi;￿ ￿ & and
@ri=@& = 18i. The f.o.c. is:
nEcG ￿ K ￿ n￿UG + n￿UR = 0 ) EcG + m + z = K=n: (9.15)
The second-order condition holds trivially. For t < T, ri;t = rj;t = rt, given by:




Note that for every t 2 f2;:::Tg, Ri;t￿1 is given by the quota in the previous period:
rt =
￿
yi ￿ gi;t ￿ qR
￿











28This presumes that country i￿ s cost of future technology is K, which is correct since, in equilibrium,
country i pays K (1 ￿ ￿) plus the subsidy ￿K (or minus the tax ￿￿K), even if this price is for the
remaining fraction ￿, after the fraction 1 ￿ ￿ has been copied for free.
30All countries have the same preferences over the &ts. Dynamic e¢ ciency requires that
the countries are not better o⁄ after a change in the &ts (and thus the gi;ts), given by
(￿&t;￿&t+1), such that G is unchanged after two periods, i.e., ￿&t+1 = ￿￿&tqG, t 2
[1;T ￿ 1]. From (9.16), this implies
￿nEC
0 (Gt)￿&t + ￿gtK + ￿ (￿&t+1 ￿ ￿gtqR)K ￿ ￿
2￿gt+1qRK ￿ 08￿&t )
(1 ￿ ￿qR)(1 ￿ ￿qG)
K
cn
= EG = EG
￿:
Thus, neither Gt nor gi;t (and, hence, neither R) can be functions of R￿. At the start of
period 1, therefore, UR = qRK=n, just as before, and UG cannot be a function of R (since
URG = 0). Since EG is a constant, we must have &1 = y ￿ (EG￿ ￿ qGG0)=n ￿ qRR0=n.
Eq. (9.13) gives @ri;t=1=@G￿ = (@ri=@gi)(@gi=@&)(@&=@G￿) = qG=n. Hence, UG =
￿qGK=n + ￿URqG = ￿qG (1 ￿ ￿qR)K=n, giving a unique equilibrium. Substituted in
(9.15), EGT =EG￿, just as in the earlier periods. Thus, gi;t = g￿
i (R￿
i) in all periods.
Proposition 6 follows since, from (3.4), @g￿















b=(b + cn2). QED
Proof of Proposition 7. The optimal T balances the cost of underinvestment when T
is short and the cost of the uncertain ￿, increasing in T. In period T, countries invest
suboptimally, not only because of the domestic hold-up problem, but also because of the
international one. When all countries invest less, ui declines. The loss in period T, relative












































Note that H increases in n, qR, K, but decreases in ￿, ￿, and b:
The cost of a longer-term agreement is associated with ￿. Although EC0 and thus EGt



























































The last term is the loss associated with the uncertainty regarding future marginal costs.















































































































> 0 and the bracket-parenthesis in-
creases in T, the loss decreases in T for small T but increases for large T, and there is a
unique T minimizing the loss (even if the loss function is not necessarily globally concave).
Since G￿ and R￿ does not enter in (9.18), T satisfying (9.18) equals b T, assuming b T will






















where the r.h.s. increases in T. T = 1 is optimal if the left-hand side of (9.19) is larger







If k=K and n are large, but b small, H is large, (9.20) is more likely to hold and, if it does
not, the T satisfying (9.19) is larger. If c or ￿2 are larger, (9.20) is less likely to hold and,
if it does not, (9.19) requires T to decrease. QED
Proof of Proposition 8. In the proofs above, k is already a function of ￿.29 QED
Proof of Proposition 9. Note that, under short-term agreements (as well as business




, investments are given by EWR = k while they
should optimally be EWR = K=n, requiring (6.2). For long-term agreements, investments
are optimal in the last period if k ￿ ￿qRK=n = K (1 ￿ ￿qR), requiring (6.3). For earlier
periods, the requirement is k = K, giving (6.4). QED
Proof of Proposition 10. The proof follows from the text. QED
Proof of Proposition 11. As noted in Section 3 as well as in the above proofs, in every
bargaining situation, the countries were symmetric when considering e yi and the (induced)
29Some caution is necessary, however. The proofs of Propositions 4-6 are unchanged only if the innova-
tor receives the subsidy or pays the tari⁄ before negotiating the price. With the reverse timing, ￿ would
have no impact when the buyer is a government. In that case, the subsidy must be paid by foreign coun-
tries (as an international subsidy), and the proofs of Propositions 4-6 would need minor modi￿cations,
although the results would continue to hold. The proofs of Propositions 0-3 can stay unchanged in all
these cases.
32investment costs. Thus, no side transfers would take place, no matter di⁄erences in the
Ris or the yis, neither on nor o⁄ the equilibrium path. QED
Proof of Proposition 12. (i) First, note that there is never any trade in permits in
equilibrium. Hence, if country i invests as predicted in Sections 3-5, the marginal bene￿t
of more technology is the same whether permits are tradable or not. Second, if i deviated
by investing more (less), it￿ s marginal utility of a higher technology decreases (increases)
not only when permit-trade is prohibited, but also when trade is allowed since more (less)
technology decreases (increases) the demand for permits and thus the equilibrium price.
Hence, such a deviation is not attractive.
(ii) Note that the bene￿t of being allowed to pollute one is equal to B0
i (￿) when the
total number of permits is ￿xed. Thus, B0
i (￿) must equal the permit price when no country
has market power in the permit market. For short-term agreements, (9.9) together with
(9.11) implies that the quota price is:
B
0
i (:) = ncG + nm = nc￿ + ncEG + nm = nc￿ + n(k ￿ m ￿ z) + nm
= nc￿ + n(k ￿ ￿qRK=n):
For the last period in long-term agreements, (9.12) implies that B0
i (yi;T) = k ￿ z =
k ￿ ￿qRK=n: For earlier periods, (9.14) implies B0







= K ￿ ￿qRK. QED
33References
Acemoglu, Daron; Antras, Pol and Helpman, Elhanan (2007): "Contracts and Technology
Adoption," American Economic Review 97 (3): 916-43.
Aldy, Joseph; Barrett, Scott and Stavins, Robert (2003): "Thirteen Plus One: A Com-
parison of Global Climate Policy Architectures," Climate Policy 3 (4): 373-97.
Aldy, Joseph and Stavins, Robert (Ed.) (2007): Architectures for Agreement, Cambridge
U. Press.
Aldy, Joseph and Stavins, Robert (Ed.) (2009): Post-Kyoto International Climate Policy,
Cambridge U. Press.
Barrett, Scott (2005): "The Theory of International Environmental Agreements," Hand-
book of Environmental Economics 3, edited by K.-G. M￿ler and J.R. Vincent.
Ba‚ sar, Tamer and Olsder, Geert Jan (1999): Dynamic Noncooperative Game Theory.
Siam, Philadelphia.
Battaglini, Marco; Nunnaro, Salvatore and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2010): "Political Institu-
tions and the Dynamics of Public Investments," mimeo, Princeton University.
Beccherle, Julien and Tirole, Jean (2011): "Regional Initiatives and the Cost of Delaying
Binding Climate Change Agreements," forthcoming, Journal of Public Economics.
Buchholz, Wolfgang and Konrad, Kai (1994): "Global Environmental Problems and the
Strategic Choice of Technology," Journal of Economics 60 (3): 299-321.
Copeland, Brian and Taylor, M. Scott (2003): Trade and the Environment: Theory and
Evidence, Princeton University Press.
Copeland, Brian and Taylor, M. Scott (2004): "Trade, growth and the environment,"
Journal of Economic Literature 42: 7-71.
Dockner, Engelbert J.; Jłrgensen, Ste⁄en; Van Long, Ngo and Sorger, Gerhard (2000):
Di⁄erential Games in Economics and Management Science, Cambridge U. Press.
Dutta, Prajit K. and Radner, Roy (2004): "Self-enforcing climate-change treaties," Proc.
Nat. Acad. Sci. U.S., 101, 4746-51.
Dutta, Prajit K. and Radner, Roy (2009): "A Strategic Analysis of Global Warming:
Theory and Some Numbers," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 71 (2):
187-209.
Ellman, Matthew (2006): "The Optimal Length of Contracts with Application to Out-
sourcing," Universitat Pompeu Fabra DP 965.
Engwerda, Jacob C. (2005): LQ Dynamic Optimization and Di⁄erential Games. Wiley.
Fershtman, Chaim and Nitzan, Shmuel (1991): "Dynamic voluntary provision of public
goods," European Economic Review 35 (5): 1057-67.
Fudenberg, Drew and Tirole, Jean (1991): Game Theory. MIT Press.
Gatsios, Konstantine and Karp, Larry (1992): "How Anti-Merger Laws can Reduce In-
vestment, Help Producers, and Harm Consumers," Journal of Industrial Economics
40 (3): 339-48.
Golombek, Rolf and Hoel, Michael (2005): "Climate Policy under Technology Spillovers,"
Environmental and Resorce Economics 31 (2): 201-27.
Golombek, Rolf, and Hoel, Michael (2006): "Second-Best Climate Agreements and Tech-
nology Policy," Advances in Economic Analysis & Policy 6 (1), Article 1, BE Press.
Grossman, Gene M. and Helpman, Elhanan (1991): Innovation and Growth in the Global
34Economy. MIT Press.
Guriev, Sergei and Kvasov, Dmitriy (2005): "Contracting on Time," American Eco-
nomic Review 95 (5): 1269-1385.
Harris, Milton and Holmstrom, Bengt (1987): "On The Duration of Agreements," Inter-
national Economic Review 28 (2): 389-406.
Harstad, B￿rd (2012): "Climate Contracts: A Game of Emissions, Investments, Negoti-
ations, and Renegotiations," Review of Economic Studies, forthcoming.
Hart, Oliver D. and John Moore (1988). "Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation,"
Econometrica 56: 755-85.
Hoel, Michael (1993): "Intertemporal properties of an international carbon tax," Re-
source and Energy Economics 15 (1): 51-70.
Hoel, Michael and de Zeeuw, Aart (2010): "Can a Focus on Breakthrough Technologies
Improve the Performance of International Environmental Agreements?" Environmen-
tal and Resource Economics 47 (3): 395-406.
Houba, Harold; Sneek, Koos and Vardy, Felix (2000): "Can negotiations prevent ￿sh
wars?" Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 24 (8): 1265-80.
Ja⁄e, Adam B.; Newell, Richard G. and Stavins, Robert N. (2003): "Technological Change
and the Environment," Handbook of Environmental Economics 1 (edited by K.-G.
M￿ler and J.R. Vincent), Elsevier.
Karp, Larry S. and Zhao, Jinhua (2009): "A Proposal for the Design of the Successor to
the Kyoto Protocol," in Aldy and Stavins (2009).
Kolstad, Charles D. and Toman, Michael (2005): "The Economics of Climate Policy,"
Handbook of Environmental Economics 3: 1562-93.
Levhari, David and Mirman, Leonard J. (1980): "The Great Fish War: An Example
Using a Dynamic Cournot-Nash Solution," Bell Journal of Economics 11 (1): 322-34.
Maskin, Eric and Tirole, Jean (2001): "Markov Perfect Equilibrium: I. Observable Ac-
tions," Journal of Economic Theory 100 (2): 191-219.
Muuls, Mirabelle (2009): "The e⁄ect of investment on bargaining positions. Over-
investment in the case of international agreements on climate change," mimeo, Impe-
rial College London.
Newell, Richard G.; Ja⁄e, Adam B. and Stavins, Robert N. (2006): "The E⁄ects of
Economic and Policy Incentives on Carbon Mitigation Technologies," Energy Eco-
nomics 28: 563-78.
Nordhaus, William D. (2006): ￿After Kyoto: Alternative Mechanisms to Control Global
Warming,￿American Economic Review 96(2): 31￿ 4.
Ploeg, Frederick van der and de Zeeuw, Art (1992): "International aspects of pollution
control," Environmental and Resource Economics 2 (2): 117-39.
Roussillon, Beatrice and Schweinzer, Paul (2010): "E¢ cient Emissions Reduction," mimeo.
Segal, Ilya and Whinston, Michael D. (2010): "Property Rights," prepared for Handbook
of Organizational Economics (Gibbons and Roberts, Eds), Elsevier.
Sorger, Gerhard (2006): "Recursive Nash Bargaining Over a Productive Asset," Journal
of Economic Dynamics and Control 30 (12): 2637-59.
Yanase, Akihiko (2006): "Dynamic Voluntary Provision of Public Goods and Optimal
Steady-State Subsidies," Journal of Public Economic Theory 8 (1): 171-9.
35